Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) utilize manufacturing variations of circuit elements to produce unpredictable response to any challenge vector. The attack on PUF aims to predict the PUF response to all challenge vectors while only a small number of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) are known. The target PUFs in this paper include the Arbiter PUF (ArbPUF) and the Memristor Crossbar PUF (MXbarPUF). The manufacturing variations of the circuit elements in the targeted PUF can be characterized by a weight vector. An optimization-theoretic attack on the target PUFs is proposed. The feasible space for a PUF's weight vector is described by a convex polytope confined by the known CRPs. The centroid of the polytope is chosen as the estimate of the actual weight vector, while new CRPs are adaptively added into the original set of known CRPs. The linear behavior of both ArbPUF and MXbarPUF is proven which ensures that the feasible space for their weight vectors is convex. Simulation shows that our approach needs 71.4% fewer known CRPs and 86.5% less time than the state-ofthe-art machine learning based approach.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of physical unclonable functions (PUFs) was first proposed by Gassend et al. in 2002 [4] . PUFs are hardware security primitives that utilize the manufacturing variations of circuit elements to produce an unpredictable response to an input challenge. We call a certain challenge Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. vector and its associated response bit/vector a challengeresponse pair (CRP). In this paper, we focus on the strong PUFs which preserve a property that the number of unique CRPs is exponential to the bitlength of the challenge vector [7] . The arbiter PUF family contains the most popular and widely studied PUFs so far. It includes the Arbiter PUF (ArbPUF) [9] and a few of its variants such as the Feedforward PUF, the XOR ArbPUF, and the Ligntweight PUF [10] [16] . Various modeling attacks [12] [13] have been proposed which model the PUFs' behavior and predict the unknown CRPs with a small number of known CRPs. Side channel information is also proven useful in attacks [14] . All the above mentioned PUFs have been successfully attacked [14] , which means their CRPs are predictable and the PUF functionality can be easily cloned. Unlike the above arbiter PUFs, the memristor crossbar PUF (MXbarPUF) proposed by Rose et al. uses the manufacturing variations of memristors as the entropy source [11] . Given the vulnerability of all delay-based PUFs to modeling attacks, it is natural to ask if the MXbarPUF is strong enough against attacks.
In this paper, we briefly revisit the linear additive delay model of the ArbPUF. Provided the linear behavior, we formulate a novel optimization-theoretic attack approach that is applicable on both PUFs. We start our attack with a small number of known CRPs. These known CRPs are equivalent to a homogeneous system of linear inequalities which forms a cone in the space of the weight vector. All dimensions of the space are bounded. We solve the optimization problem of finding the centroid of the truncated cone and use it as the estimate of the actual weight vector. We then apply a new challenge that cuts through this centroid on the PUF under attack, observe its response and add this CRP into the set of known CRPs. We then find out that the MXbarPUF has the same linear behavior based on a weight representation of the manufacturing variations of memristors, and the above attack approach is hence applicable to the MXbarPUF as well. We are able to attack both kinds of PUFs with challenge vectors up to 256 bits with high precision. Compared to the state-of-the-art machine learning attack approaches, on average our approach needs 71.4% fewer known CRPs and 86.5% less time.
The contribution of this paper is as follows.
• We formulate an attack approach on the ArbPUFs with optimization theory based on its linear behavior.
• We we derive a linear model of the MXbarPUF and prove the above attack approach applicable to the MXbarPUF. • We apply this approach to attack these PUFs up to 256 bits and show that it significantly outperforms the existing approach.
ARBITER PUF ATTACK FORMULATION

Arbiter PUF
As shown in Fig. 1 , each bit in the challenge vector controls one stage of multiplexers. If the bit is 1, then the signal path in this stage will not cross, i.e. the upper (lower) output of the previous stage will be selected by the upper (lower) multiplexer. If that bit is 0, then the opposite happens. Process variations will cause a delay difference in each stage, and the response of the arbiter is determined by which of the two paths is faster.
We show the mathematical model of the ArbPUF here. This model can be utilized to functionally clone the ArbPUF. The full derivation can be found in [9] . In brief details, we denote the difference between the cumulative delay of the upper path and that of the lower path after the i th stage as ∆i, and the incremental delay difference added as the i th stage in the non-crossing or crossing case by δ 1 i or δ 0 i , respectively. Then, for each stage, the relation between the cumulative delay difference and the incremental delay difference is
where ∆0 = 0 and C = (C1, C2, ..., Cn) is the challenge vector. With this inductive equation, the cumulative delay after the n th stage can be derived as the following:
where Φ = (φ1, φ2, ..., φn+1) T is a function of the challenge vector, called the feature vector; and D = (d1, d2, ..., dn+1) encodes the manufacturing variations of all the delay paths in each stage of multiplexers and is called the weight vector. The response bit is determined by the arbiter, which simply compares the delay of the two paths and determines which path is faster, i.e. whether ∆n is positive or negative:
If an attacker knows the circuitry of the ArbPUF, he/she only needs to find a good enough estimate of D to reproduce all the CRPs of the ArbPUF.
Existing Attacks on PUFs
An attacker only needs to clone the functionality of the PUF, i.e. to reproduce the response to all challenges with high precision. For strong PUFs such as ArbPUFs and MXbarPUFs, since the number of unique CRPs is exponential to the size of the challenge vector, it is impractical to enumerate all the CRPs to clone the PUF.
When Lim et al. first proposed the ArbPUF architecture and derived its linear additive delay model in [9] , they were also successful in developing a machine learning (ML) based attack approach. Moreover, they claimed that the vulnerability of ArbPUF to such attack can be overcome by introducing a feed-forward arbiter in the circuitry and break the linearity [9] . However, Rührmair et al. improved the ML based modeling attack approach [12] [13] and further developed the ML based attacks by utilizing power and timing side-channel information. They were able to predict all CRPs of any delay-based PUF (i.e. ArbPUF and its variants) up to 512 bits and 16 XOR inputs with 95% accuracy within a reasonable time [14] .
Attack Formulation
We propose an approach for attacking the ArbPUF in this section. However, as is shown in the next section, this approach is also applicable to the MXbarPUF, as they share a similar linear property.
We assume that the attacker knows the circuitry of the targeted PUFs, has an original set of known CRPs and is able to choose new challenge vectors, test their responses and add these CRPs into the set of known CRPs.
With the original set of known CRPs, according to (3),
we know the sign of Φ T · D, where Φ denotes the feature vector derived from a challenge vector in the set of known CRPs. We can then build a homogeneous system of linear inequalities:
We need to find an estimate of the actual D, denoted byˆ D.
The overall idea to do this is to form a recursive polyhedral description [17] of the feasible space of D. The above linear constraints outlines a (n + 1)-dimensional cone that the actual vector D must be in. As each element in D is bounded, the feasible space is a convex and closed polytope (a cone truncated by a box). Intuitively, the centroid D of the polytope should be a good estimate or the actual D.
There are a few different versions of the centroid of a polytope. Here we choose the Chebyshev center, which is the center of the largest ball inside the polytope. One can see that this is a reasonable estimate of the actual weight vector. The optimization problem is constructed as below:
where d lb,j and d ub,j are the lower and upper bounds of element dj in D, and P stands for the surface of the polytope. We then generate a whole new set of CRPs and test our estimate. The prediction rate η is defined as η = number of CRPs correctly predicted byˆ D total number of CRPs for test (6) If the prediction rate is lower than a pre-determined ratio, then we need to generate a new challenge vector. The new CRP ( Φ k+1 , r k+1 ) changes the original system of linear inequalities by adding one constraint:
The new feature vector derived by the new challenge vector should minimize the uncertainty of the estimate of D in the next iteration. In order to find such a challenge vector, we rely on the theory of cutting plane methods. In this context, we would like to find a new feature vector which cuts the original polytope into two equal halves. One side would be no longer feasible towards the estimation of D. the new polytope will be used to compute the new estimate D . Since the volume of the feasible polytope has been reduced, the uncertainty of our estimate has also reduced.
The challenge is to find such a CRP. We find such a CRP by minimizing the distance between the current estimate and the hyperplane represented by Φ k+1 . In order to do this, we solve the following integer program in (8) .
We then calculate the response ri+1 of the actual D to Φ k+1 . Now we have one more member in the set of known CRPs, and we go back to solve (5) . An illustration of our approach is shown in Fig. 2 . The black polytope stands for the original polytope, and the black dot inside is the Chebyshev center and is our estimate of the actual weight vector. The red line stands for a new CRP that is added into the original set of known CRPs.
MEMRISTOR CROSSBAR PUF
In this section, we introduce the MXbarPUF and show that the approach of attacking the ArbPUF is also applicable to MXbarPUF. 
Memristor and MXbarPUF
In 1971, Chua predicted the existence and behavior of memristors [3] . The I-V characteristic of a memristor is a hysteresis loop pinched at the origin [2] . The memristance, i.e. the resistance of a memristor, can be changed between its supremum MH and infimum ML. The two extreme states are called the high resistance state (HRS) and the low resistance state (LRS), respectively. Memristors are polar. When the voltage applied is positive, the memristance will decrease until it reaches ML; when the voltage is negative, the memristance will increase until it reaches MH . When there is no voltage on the memristor, the memristance is unchanged. This non-volatile property is desirable for many applications. After Strukov et al. first fabricated memristors in 2008 [15] , memristors have been extensively studied for neuromorphic computing [8] , computer memory [5] and hardware security [1] .
The manufacturing variation of memristors can be utilized as the entropy source for hardware security primitives such as PUFs. Rose and Meade [11] designed the memristor crossbar PUF as shown in Fig. 4 . The PUF works as follows.
The DON E signal indicates if the PUF response is finalized and is 0 initially. The PUF has the following stages:
• The RESET Stage. Before any challenge vector is applied, a sufficiently long RESET = 1 pulse is given, biasing all the memristors with −VDD and resetting them to HRS.
• The SET Stage. In this stage, RESET = 0, and R/W = CLOCK = 0. The multiplexers beside each row of memristors select the output of the NOR gate, which is either Ci or Ci, i = 1, 2, ..., n. VDD is applied on the memristors in the rows selected by the challenge vector, and their memristance will decrease.
• The READ Stage. When CLOCK = 1, VRD is select- The SET and READ stages alternate until the DON E signal becomes 1. We assume that the frequency of CLOCK is so high that the two inputs of any arbiter will not toggle in the same cycle.
MXbarPUF Modeling
After the PUF response is finalized, we define the conductance of the memristor at the a th row and the b th column as
and the equivalent resistance of column j (resistance between VRD and ground) as Rj Gj, C = 1
where C = C1, C1, C2, C2, ..., Cn, Cn
is the expanded challenge vector. Then for column j, the voltage on RLD during this final READ stage can be expressed as a voltage divider:
The difference between the voltage on a pair of RLD corresponding to arbiter i (in column 2i − 1 and column 2i), denoted by ∆V , is
On the right side of (13), the denominator, VRD and RLD are always positive. We define Ui as below. One can find that the sign of Ui is always the same as that of ∆Vi.
where
Note that Ci = 1−Ci for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we can then expand the vector products in (14) as
for l = 1, 2, . . . , n and i =1, 2, . . . , k (17) where k is the number of arbiters and further define
Then (16) can be simplified as
is the feature vector and
Because the response of each arbiter is explicitly given, each 2-column PUF can be attacked separately, and we omit the index 'i' of arbiters. Then, the response of an arbiter can be expressed as:
One can see that looks exactly the same as (3), and Φ and D both have the same meaning as those in (3): Φ is a function of the challenge vector, and D stands for the process variations. This is why our attack approach based on this expression can be applied to attack both the ArbPUF and the MXbarPUF.
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We use MATLAB for all simulation on a desktop computer with Intel Core i5-4590 CPU at 3.3GHz, 16 GB RAM and Windows 7 64-bit Operating System. The Chebyshev center of a polytope is calculated using the Multi-Parametric Toolbox 3.0 [6] . We also implemented logistic regression with resilient propagation, the state-of-the-art machine learning (ML) approach, on the same platform for comparison. Table 1 and Table 2 show the comparison between our approach and the ML approach on both the ArbPUF and the MXbarPUF up to 256 bits. For either kind of PUF, any bitlength and any prediction rate listed, our approach always needs fewer known CRPs and shorter time. If we average over all cases, our approach needs 71.4% fewer known CRPs and 86.5% less time. To visualize the contrast, Fig. 5 illustrates the growth of prediction rate over the number of known CRPs and time in the 128-bit MXbarPUF case.
It is not surprising that our approach works much better than the conventional machine learning approach. The ML approach does not take advantage of the linear nature of the PUFs. Given the same set of known CRPs, our approach returns the centroid of the polytope represented by these CRPs, which is arguably a reasonable estimate of the actual weight vector; whereas machine learning returns an arbitrary point inside the polytope, because the ML algorithm is based on minimizing a non-negative cost function, and the value of the cost function inside the polytope where all the known CRPs are satisfied must be 0. What is more, still using optimization theory, we adaptively choose a new CRP to add into the original set, so that the volume of the original polytope is divided into two almost equal halves, thus the uncertainty of the next estimate is minimized. The machine learning approach does not have this adaptive strategy either, and all new CRPs are arbitrarily chosen. This explains why our approach needs fewer known CRPs and runs faster.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Although the linear behavior of the ArbPUF has been known ever since the ArbPUF was first introduced in [9] , no attack on it was actually related to optimization theory. We formulate and implement the attack on PUFs with linear behavior utilizing optimization theory. It turns out that our approach outperforms the existing ML approach.
Another contribution of this paper is that the linear behavior of the MXbarPUF is revealed. The MXbarPUF is a new member in the PUF family, and we formulate the first attack on it. Unlike the ArbPUF, the linear behavior of the MXbarPUF is not as straightforward. The weight representation of memristor manufacturing variations is necessary in deriving the linear behavior of MXbarPUF. Comparison of the number of known CRPs and the time needed to attack the 128-bit MXbarPUF to reach 99% prediction rate using our optimization-theoretic approach and machine learning (ML) approach However, there is also a clear limitation in our approach. It relies on the linear behavior of the PUFs, therefore, it cannot be applied on any non-linear PUF, such as the feedforward PUF and any PUF with an XOR'ed output. This is because the polytope characterized by the CRPs of these PUFs is not convex, and the Chebyshev center may fall outside the polytope and may not be a feasible estimate of the actual weight vector.
This work along with the machine learning attacks in prior art prove all members of the delay-based PUF family as well as the MXbarPUF vulnerable to modeling attacks. Countermeasures or new PUF architectures must be developed to let PUFs withstand modeling attacks and fulfill the requirements for unclonability as is in its name. 
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